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Abstract—Transport and security protocols are essential to
ensure reliable and secure communication between two parties.
For IoT applications, these protocols must be lightweight, since
IoT devices are usually resource constrained. Unfortunately, the
existing transport and security protocols – namely TCP/TLS and
UDP/DTLS – fall short in terms of connection overhead, latency,
and connection migration when used in IoT applications. In
this paper, after studying the root causes of these shortcomings,
we show how utilizing QUIC in IoT scenarios results in a
higher performance. Based on these observations, and given the
popularity of MQTT as an IoT application layer protocol, we
integrate MQTT with QUIC. By presenting the main APIs and
functions developed, we explain how connection establishment
and message exchange functionalities work. We evaluate the
performance of MQTTw/QUIC versus MQTTw/TCP using wired,
wireless, and long-distance testbeds. Our results show that
MQTTw/QUIC reduces connection overhead in terms of the
number of packets exchanged with the broker by up to 56%. In
addition, by eliminating half-open connections, MQTTw/QUIC
reduces processor and memory usage by up to 83% and 50%,
respectively. Furthermore, by removing the head-of-line blocking
problem, delivery latency is reduced by up to 55%. We also show
that the throughput drops experienced by MQTTw/QUIC when
a connection migration happens is considerably lower than that
of MQTTw/TCP.
Index Terms—Internet of Things (IoT); Transport layer; Ap-
plication layer; Latency; Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things is the enabler of many applica-
tions, such as the smart home, smart cities, remote medical
monitoring, and industrial control, by connecting a large
number of sensors and actuators to the Internet. Existing
studies predict that the number of connected devices will
surpass 50 billion by 2020 [1]. To facilitate interconnection
and software development, the communication between IoT
devices usually employs a protocol stack similar to that of
regular Internet-connected devices such as smartphones and
laptops. Specifically, IP (or 6LowPAN [2]) and transport layer
protocols are provided by various protocol stacks (e.g., µIP
[3], LwIP [4]) to enable interconnectivity.
A. TCP and UDP
The primary responsibility of the transport layer is to sup-
port exchanging segments between the two end-to-end com-
municating applications. Among the transport layer protocols,
TCP (Transport Layer Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram
Protocol) are the most widely used, depending on the appli-
cation at hand. TCP provides a reliable end-to-end connection
and implements congestion control mechanisms to avoid buffer
overflow at the receiver. During the past couple of decades,
several improved versions of TCP have been proposed to ad-
dress the increasing demand for throughput [5], [6]. However,
these features impose high overhead in terms of connection
establishment and resource (i.e., processor, memory, energy)
utilization. UDP, on the other hand, does not provide any of
the above-mentioned features and therefore, its overhead is
significantly lower than that of TCP.
While throughput is the main performance metric for user
traffic such as voice and video, the prevalent communication
type of IoT, which is machine-to-machine (M2M), is character-
ized by short-lived bursts of exchanging small data chunks [7],
[8]. In addition, compared to user devices such as smartphones
and laptops, IoT devices are usually resource constrained in
terms of processing, memory, and energy [9], [10]. Using TCP
in IoT domains to satisfy reliability and security requirements,
therefore, imposes high overhead. Specifically, the shortcom-
ings of TCP when used in IoT applications are as follows:
– Connection startup latency is highly affected by the TCP
handshake. This handshake requires 1 Round-Trip Time
(RTT) for TCP and 2 or 3 RTTs when TLS (Transport
Layer Security) is added to this protocol [11]. The overhead
impact is even higher in IoT scenarios where unreliable
wireless links cause frequent connection drops [12]. In
these scenarios, imposing a high connection establishment
overhead for the exchange of a small amount of data results
in wasting the resources of devices. TCP Fast Open [13]
seeks to address this problem by piggybacking data in SYN
segments in repeated connections to the same server. This
solution is not scalable since the TCP SYN segment can
only fit a limited amount of data [14].
– IoT devices are often mobile, and as such, supporting
connection migration is an essential requirement [15]–[18].
However, any change in network parameters (such as IP
address or port) breaks the connection. In this case, either
the connection must be re-established, or a gateway is
required to reroute the data flow. Unfortunately, these so-
lutions increase communication delay and overhead, which
might not be acceptable in mission-critical applications such
as medical monitoring [8].
– To preserve energy resources, IoT devices usually transition
between sleep and awake states [19], [20]. In this case, a
TCP connection cannot be kept open without employing
keep-alive packets. These keep-alive mechanisms, however,
increase resource utilization and bandwidth consumption.
Without an external keep-alive mechanism, IoT devices are
obliged to re-establish connections every time they wake
from the sleep mode.
– In disastrous events such as unexpected reboots or a device
crash, TCP connections between client and server might
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2end up out of state. This undefined state is referred to as
TCP half-open connections [21]. A half-open connection
consumes resources such as memory and processor time. In
addition, it can impose serious threats such as SYN flooding
[22], [23].
– If packets are dropped infrequently during a data flow,
the receiver has to wait for dropped packets to be re-
transmitted in order to complete the packet re-ordering. This
phenomena, which impedes packet delivery performance, is
called the head-of-line blocking [24]–[26].
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, several IoT ap-
plication layer protocols rely on TCP, and some of them
offer mechanisms to remedy these shortcomings. For example,
MQTT [27] employs application layer keep-alive messages
to keep the connection alive. This mechanism also enables
MQTT to detect connection breakdown and release the re-
sources.
Another transport layer protocol used in IoT networks
is UDP. Generally, UDP is suitable for applications where
connection reliability is not essential. Although this is not
acceptable in many IoT scenarios, several IoT application layer
protocols rely on UDP due to its lower overhead compared to
TCP. These protocols usually include mechanisms to support
reliability and block transmission (e.g., CoAP [28]).
B. TLS and DTLS
In addition to reliability, it is essential for IoT applications
to employ cryptographic protocols to secure end-to-end data
exchange over transport layer. TLS [29] is the most common
connection-oriented and stateful client-server cryptographic
protocol. Symmetric encryption in TLS enables authenticated,
confidential, and integrity-preserved communication between
two devices. The key for this symmetric encryption is gener-
ated during the TLS handshake and is unique per connection.
In order to establish a connection, the TLS handshake can
require up to two round-trips between the server and client.
However, since connections might be dropped due to phe-
nomenons such as sleep phases, connection migration, and
packet loss, the overhead of establishing secure connections
imposes high overhead. In order to address this concern, a
lighter version of TLS for datagrams, named DTLS (Datagram
Transport Layer Security) [30], has been introduced. Unlike
TLS, DTLS does not require a reliable transport protocol as
it can encrypt or decrypt out-of-order packets. Therefore, it
can be used with UDP. Although the security level offered
by DTLS is equivalent to TLS, some of the technical dif-
ferences include: the adoption of stream ciphers is prohib-
ited, and an explicit sequence number is included in every
DTLS message. Compared to TLS, DTLS is more suitable
for resource-constrained devices communicating through an
unreliable channel. However, similar to TLS, the underlying
mechanism in DTLS has been primarily designed for point-to-
point communication. This creates a challenge to secure one-
to-many connections such as broadcasting and multicasting. In
addition, since DTLS identifies connections based on source
IP and port number, it does not support connection migration
[31]. Furthermore, DTLS handshake packets are large and may
fragment each datagram into several DTLS records where each
record is fit into an IP datagram. This can potentially cause
record overhead [32].
C. Contributions
Given the shortcomings of UDP and TCP, we argue that the
enhancement of transport layer protocols is a necessary step in
the performance improvement of IoT applications. In order to
address this concern, this paper presents the implementation
and studies the integration of QUIC [33] with application layer
to address these concerns. QUIC is a user space, UDP-based,
stream-based, and multiplexed transport protocol developed
by Google. According to [14], around 7% of the world-wide
Internet traffic employs QUIC. This protocol offers all the
functionalities required to be considered a connection-oriented
transport protocol. In addition, QUIC solves the numerous
problems faced by other connection-oriented protocols such
as TCP and SCTP [34]. Specifically, the addressed problems
are: reducing the connection setup overhead, supporting mul-
tiplexing, removing the head-of-line blocking, supporting con-
nection migration, and eliminating TCP half-open connections.
QUIC executes a cryptographic handshake that reduces the
overhead of connection establishment by employing known
server credentials learned from past connections. In addition,
QUIC reduces transport layer overhead by multiplexing several
connections into a single connection pipeline. Furthermore,
since QUIC uses UDP, it does not maintain connection status
information in the transport layer. This protocol also eradicates
the head-of-line blocking delays by applying a lightweight
data-structure abstraction called streams.
At present, there is no open source or licensed version of
MQTT using QUIC. Current MQTT implementations (such
as Paho [35]) rely on TCP/TLS to offer reliable and secure
delivery of packets. Given the potentials of QUIC and its
suitability in IoT scenarios, in this paper we implement and
study the integration of MQTT with QUIC. First, since the data
structures and message mechanisms of MQTT are intertwined
with the built-in TCP and TLS APIs, it was necessary to
redesign these data structures. The second challenge was to
establish IPC (Inter-Process Communication) between QUIC
and MQTT. MQTTw/TCP utilizes the available APIs for
user space and kernel communication. However, there is no
available API for QUIC and MQTT to communicate, as they
are both user space processes. To address these challenges,
we have developed new APIs, which are referred to as agents.
Specifically, we implemented two types of agents: server-
agent and client-agent, where the former handles the broker-
specific operations and the latter handles the functionalities of
publisher and subscriber. This paper presents all the functions
developed and explains the connection establishment and
message exchange functionalities by presenting their respec-
tive algorithms. The third challenge was to strip QUIC of
mechanisms not necessary for IoT scenarios. QUIC is a web
traffic protocol composed of a heavy code footprint (1.5GB
[36]). We have significantly reduced the code footprint (to
around 22MB) by eliminating non-IoT related code segments
such as loop network and proxy backend support.
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Fig. 1. The messages exchanged by QUIC during (a) 1-RTT and (b) 0-RTT
connections.
Three types of testbeds were used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of MQTTw/QUIC versus MQTTw/TCP: wired, wire-
less, and long-distance. Our results show that, in terms of the
number of packets exchanged during the connection estab-
lishment phase, MQTTw/QUIC offers a 56.2% improvement
over MQTTw/TCP. By eliminating half-open connections,
MQTTw/QUIC reduces processor and memory usage by up
to 83.2% and 50.3%, respectively, compared to MQTTw/TCP.
Furthermore, by addressing the head-of-line blocking problem,
MQTTw/QUIC reduces message delivery latency by 55.6%,
compared to MQTTw/TCP. In terms of connection migration,
the throughput drop experienced by MQTTw/QUIC is signif-
icantly lower than that of MQTTw/TCP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
explains the QUIC protocol along with its potential bene-
fits in IoT applications. The implementation of QUIC for
MQTT is explained in Section III. Performance evaluation
and experimentation results are given in Section IV. Section
V overviews the existing studies on QUIC and IoT application
layer protocols. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. QUIC
QUIC employs some of the basic mechanisms of TCP and
TLS, while keeping UDP as its underlying transport layer
protocol. QUIC is in fact a combination of transport and
security protocols by performing tasks including encryption,
packet re-ordering, and retransmission. This section overviews
the main functionalities of this protocol and justifies the
importance of its adoption in the context of IoT.
A. Connection Establishment
QUIC combines transport and secure layer handshakes to
minimize the overhead and latency of connection establish-
ment. To this end, a dedicated reliable stream is provided for
the cryptographic handshake. Figure 1(a) and (b) show the
packets exchanged during the 1-RTT and 0-RTT connection
establishment phases, respectively. Connection establishment
works as follows:
– First handshake. In order to retrieve the server’s config-
uration, the client sends an inchoate client hello (CHLO)
message. Since the server is an alien to the client, the
server must send a REJ packet. This packet carries the server
configuration including the long-term Diffie-Hellman value,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Flags 
(8)
Connection identifier (64) 
(optional)
QUIC
Header
Version (32) 
(Client-only, optional)
Diversification 
Nonce (256)
Packet Number (8-48)
Type (8) Stream ID (8-32) Offset (0-64)
Data length
 (0 or 16)
Stream Data 
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Fig. 2. The solid and dashed lines show the clear-text and encrypted parts
of a QUIC packet, respectively. The non-encrypted part is used for routing
and decrypting the encrypted part of the packet.
connection ID (cid), port numbers, key agreement, and ini-
tial data exchange. After receiving the server’s configuration,
the client authenticates the server by verifying the certificate
chain and the signature received in the REJ message. At this
point, the client sends a complete CHLO packet to the server.
This message contains the client’s ephemeral Diffie-Helman
public value. This concludes the first handshake.
– Final and repeat handshake. After receiving the complete
CHLO packet, the client has the initial keys for the connection
and starts sending application data to the server. For 0-
RTT, the client must initiate sending encrypted data with
its initial keys before waiting for a reply from the server.
If the handshake was successful, the server sends a server
hello (SHLO) message. This concludes the final and repeat
handshake.
Except some handshake and reset packets, QUIC packets
are fully authenticated and partially encrypted. Figure 2 shows
the non-encrypted and encrypted parts of the packet using
solid and dotted lines, respectively. The non-encrypted packet
header is used for routing and decrypting the packet content.
The flags encode the presence of cid and the length of
the Packet Number (PN) field, which are visible to read the
subsequent fields.
B. Connection Migration
The QUIC connections are identified by a randomly gen-
erated 64-bit Connection Identifier (cid). A cid is allocated
per connection and allows the clients to roam between net-
works without being affected by the changes in the network
or transport layer parameters. As shown in Figure 2, cid
resides in the header (non-encrypted part) and makes the
clients independent of network address translation (NAT) and
restoration of connections. The cid plays an important role
in routing, specifically for connection identification purposes.
Furthermore, using cids enables multipath by probing a new
path for connection. This process is called path validation [37].
During a connection migration, the end point assumes that
the peer is willing to accept packets at its current address.
Therefore, an end point can migrate to a new IP address
without first validating the peer’s IP address. It is possible
that the new path does not support the current sending rate of
the endpoint. In this case, the end point needs to reconstitute
its congestion controller [38]. On the other hand, receiving
non-probe packets [39] from a new peer address confirms that
the peer has migrated to the new IP address.
4C. Security
For transport layer encryption, MQTTw/TCP usually relies
on TLS/SSL. The primary reasons why TLS/SSL cannot be
used in QUIC were described in [40]. In short, the TLS
security model uses one session key, while QUIC uses two
session keys. This difference, in particular, enables QUIC to
offer 0-RTT because data can be encrypted before the final key
is set. Thus, the model has to deal with data exchange under
multiple session keys [41]. Therefore, MQTTw/QUIC uses
its own encryption algorithm named QUIC Crypto [42]. This
algorithm decrypts packets independently to avoid serialized
decoding dependencies. The signature algorithms supported by
Crypto are ECDSA-SHA256 and RSA-PSS-SHA256.
D. Multiplexing
Unlike TCP, QUIC is adept in transport layer header com-
pression by using multiplexing. Instead of opening multiple
connections from the same client, QUIC opens several streams
multiplexed over a single connection. Each connection is
identified by a unique cid. The odd cids are for client-
initiated streams and even cids are for server-initiated streams.
A stream is a lightweight abstraction that provides a reliable
bidirectional byte-stream. A QUIC stream can form an appli-
cation message up to 264 bytes. Furthermore, in the case of
packet loss, the application is not prevented from processing
subsequent packets. Multiplexing is useful in IoT applications
where a large amount of data transfer is required per trans-
action. For example, this feature enhances performance for
remote updates and industrial automation [43].
E. Flow and Congestion Control
Similar to TCP, QUIC implements a flow control mecha-
nism to prevent the receiver’s buffer from being inundated with
data [14]. A slow TCP draining stream can consume the entire
receiver buffer. This can eventually block the sender from
sending any data through the other streams. QUIC eliminates
this problem by applying two levels of flow control: (i)
Connection level flow control: limits the aggregate buffer that
a sender can consume across all the streams on a receiver. (ii)
Stream level flow control: limits the buffer per stream level. A
QUIC receiver communicates the capability of receiving data
by periodically advertising the absolute byte offset per stream
in window update frames for sent, received, and delivered
packets.
QUIC incorporates a pluggable congestion control algorithm
and provides a richer set of information than TCP [44]. For
example, each packet (original or re-transmitted) carries a new
Packet Number (PN). This enables the sender to distinguish
between the re-transmitted and original ACKs, hence removing
TCP’s re-transmission ambiguity problem. QUIC utilizes a
NACK based mechanism, where two types of packets are
reported: the largest observed packet number, and the unseen
packets with a packet number lesser than that of the largest
observed packet. A receive timestamp is also included in every
newly-acked ACK frame. QUIC’s ACKs can also provide the
delay between the receipt of a packet and its acknowledge-
ment, which helps in calculating RTT. QUIC’s ACK frames
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Fig. 3. The high-level architecture of the proposed implementation.
support up to 256 NACK ranges in opposed to the TCP’s 3
NACK range [45]. This makes QUIC more resilient to packet
reordering than TCP (with SACK). The congestion control
algorithm of QUIC is based on TCP Reno to determine the
pacing rate and congestion window size [45]. In addition,
QUIC supports two congestion control algorithms: (i) Pacing
Based Congestion Control Algorithm (PBCCA) [46], and (ii)
TCP CUBIC [47]. The superior performance of QUIC’s flow
control over TCP for HTTP traffic has been demonstrated in
the literature [48].
III. INTEGRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF MQTT WITH QUIC
This section presents the integration of MQTT with QUIC
and is divided into six sub-sections. The first sub-section
overviews the system architecture. The second sub-section
describes the definitions, methods, and assumptions. The third
and fourth sub-sections explain the operations of the APIs and
functions developed for the broker and clients, respectively.
We present the common APIs and functions, which are used by
the broker and client in the fifth sub-section. A short discussion
about code reduction is presented in the sixth sub-section. In
order to simplify the discussions, we refer to the publisher and
the subscriber as client. The presented implementation for the
client and broker are based on the open-source Eclipse Paho
and Mosquitto [35], respectively.
A. Architecture
Both MQTT and QUIC belong to the application layer. To
streamline their integration, either the QUIC library (ngtcp2
[49]) must be imported into MQTT, or new interfaces must
be created. However, the former approach is not suitable
for resource-constrained IoT devices as QUIC libraries are
developed mainly for HTTP/HTTPS traffic, and therefore,
impose a heavy code footprint. In our implementation, we
chose the latter approach and built a customized broker and
client interfaces for MQTT and QUIC. We refer to these
interfaces as agents, which enable IPC between the MQTT
and QUIC. Figure 3 shows a high level view of the protocol
stack architecture.
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Fig. 4. Server-agent and client-agent are two entities between QUIC and
MQTT. This figure represents the packet processing flow by the server and
client agents.
Since QUIC uses UDP, connection-oriented features such
as reliability, congestion control, and forward error correction
are implemented in QUIC. In addition, QUIC incorporates
cyptographic shields, such as IP spoofing protection and packet
reordering [50]. To keep the QUIC implementation lightweight
and abstracted, we segregated the implementation into two
parts: (i) the QUIC client and server only deal with UDP
sockets and streams; (ii) the agents deal with reliability and
security.
Figure 4 shows the high-level view of the server and client
agent implementations. The implemented entities are as fol-
lows: (i) Server-Agent APIs and functions: They handle server
specific roles such as accepting incoming UDP connections,
setting clients’ state, and storing and forwarding packets to
the subscribers based on topics. (ii) Client-Agent APIs and
functions: They perform client-specific tasks such as opening
a UDP connection, and constructing QUIC header and streams.
(iii) Common APIs and functions: They are utilized by both
the server and client. However, their tasks differ based on their
roles.
After initializing the transmit and receive message
queues by initialize_rx_tx_msg_queue(), the server
and client agents process the messages differently. In
the server-agent, the received message queue is fed to
quic_input_message(). This API begins the handshake
process to negotiate the session keys. However, if the client has
contacted the server in the past, then quic_input_message()
is directly available for the crypt_quic_message() to parse
the incoming MQTT message. On the other hand, the client-
agent first processes the MQTT message and then sends that
message to the server by using start_connect(). Based on
the communication history between the server and client, the
start_connect() API either enters or skips the handshake
process with the server. The common APIs handle the hand-
shake control messages.
B. Definitions, Methods, and Assumptions
This section presents the primitives used to present and
explain the implementations. Table I shows the main acronyms
and notations used in the rest of this paper. We chose most of
these notations based on the RFCs published relevant to this
work.
Notation {0, 1}∗ represents the set of all finite-length binary
strings. If a and b are two uniquely decodable strings, then
(a, b) simply represents the concatenation of both. If κ ∈ N,
then 1κ represents the κ consecutive strings of 1 bits. The
notation s $−→ S represents the uniform random selection
of s from a finite set S. The set of integers [1, .....n] is
represented by [n], where n ∈ N. We also assume that a public
key infrastructure (PKI) is available. This means that public
keys are user-identity bounded, valid, and publicly known.
Therefore, certificates and their verification are excluded from
the implementation.
A Digital Signature Scheme (SS) with message space Msg
is used by the broker during a connection establishment to
authenticate certain data. The scheme is defined as follows,
SS = (Kg, Sign, Ver) (1)
where Kg, Sign and Ver are the randomization key genera-
tion algorithm, signing algorithm, and verification algorithm,
respectively. The input of Kg is the security parameter λ and
its output is a public and secret key pair, as follows,
Kg(λ) $−→ (pk, sk) (2)
The signing algorithm returns a signature,
Sign(sk,m) $−→ σ (3)
where sk is the secret key and m ∈ Msg. The verification
algorithm is denoted as follows,
Ver(pk,m, σ)→ p (4)
where pk is the public key and p ∈ {0, 1}. The output value p,
which is a bit, shows whether the signature is valid or invalid.
The requirement for correctness of SS is Ver(pk,m,
Sign(sk,m)) = 1 for every m ∈ Msg and Kg(λ). Correctness is
defined by the requirement that the input of one party’s msend
be equal to the output of the other party’s mget.
Secure channel implementation is based on an authenti-
cated encryption with associative data schemes (AEAD) [52].
AEAD consists of two algorithms: E and D. First, E is a
deterministic encryption algorithm defined as follows,
E(k, nonc,m,H)→ c (5)
where c is ciphertext, nonc ∈ {0, 1}n, message m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
H ∈ {0, 1}∗ is an additional authenticated data, and key k is
defined as
{0, 1}λ $−→ κ (6)
Second, D is a deterministic decryption algorithm defined as,
D(κ, nonc,H, E)→ pl or ⊥ (7)
where pl is plaintext.
The correctness requirement of AEAD is
D(κ,nonc,H ,E(κ,nonc,H ,m)) ≡ m for all κ ∈ {0, 1}λ,
nonc ∈ {0, 1}n, H and m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
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KEY NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Variable Description
⊥ Represents a rejected message
λ Protocol-associated security parameter used to derive the session keys
κ Input key {0, 1}κ $−→ κ
E Deterministic algorithm used in AEAD
H SHA-256 function
σ Signature used in digital signature scheme
(pk, sk) Key pair representing public key and secret key
a Derived by {primes of size λ} $−→ a
action_flag Flag used to determine if packet is subject to transmission or processing
b Derived by {generators of Za} $−→ b
C Client (i.e., publisher or subscriber)
CHLO Client hello message in QUIC, a.k.a., inchoate hello (c_i_hello)
cid Connection identifier
client_info Struct used in storing client info such as cid, socket, etc.
client_initial Client’s initial state, which is the state immediately after receiving REJ message from server
D Deterministic algorithm used in AEAD
DH Diffie-Helman public values
dup Flag in MQTT (value 1 indicates the packet is a retransmission)
HMAC Key hash message authentication used in expansion of keys [51]
ik Initial key variable set in the initial phase of QUIC’s connection establishment
init bit initializer, init ∈ {0, 1}
iv Initialization vector
k Key to derive data in final_data() phase
Kg Key generation algorithm takes λ as security parameter and generates (pk,sk) as key pair in QUIC
kstk Derived same as session key (for simplicity, in our implementation we treat kstk as random string to replicate unpredictable input)
M Message to be sent or received by client or server in QUIC
m The message part of Msg
msgid Message ID for MQTT queuing
Msg Message space used in QUIC(Msg consists of bitstrings starting with a 1, while key exchange messages to be encrypted start with a 0)
nonc Nonce
pub Public DH Values
pk Public key
REJ Reject message (message from server after CHLO in QUIC)
retained Flag used in MQTT to prevent loosing subscribed topics when a connection loss happens
RTT Round-trip time
S Server
scfg Variable (output by scfg_gen()) to represent the global state of server in QUIC
scid Server’s cid
SHLO Server Hello packet (s_hello) in QUIC
sk Secret key
sqn Sequence number (used in signalling for every segment in QUIC)
stk Source address token to guard IP-spoofing in QUIC
strikerng Strike variable used by QUIC
C. Server-agent
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation of these APIs and
functions. Our server-agent implementation is event-based.
When an event packet_process occurs, the server-agent de-
termines whether to transmit the packet or insert it into
the receiving queue. Server-agent APIs and functions are
described as follows:
1) main(): If the packet is subject to transmission, then
action_flag is set, otherwise the packet will be processed
by process_rx_packets(). This function also handles the
disconnect events. If the server receives a disconnect event,
then particular clients will be disconnected. However, the
server might receive a disconnect event for all the clients. This
happens, for example, when a reboot event occurs.
2) process_rx_packets(): It processes the packets in
the receive queue by quic_input_message().
3) quic_input_message(): This API first checks
whether the handshake process with the client has been
completed or not. In order to determine this, it checks
the handshake_completed flag. If it has been set, then it
assumes that the connection is alive and handshake has been
completed. In this case, the API skips the handshake process
and enters the do_handshake_once() API to set the flag for
encryption or decryption. If the handshake_completed flag is
not set, then the API runs the handshake process by executing
do_handshake(), where the client and server either follow
the 1-RTT or 0-RTT implementation. This API also sets the
client’s state according to its operation. For instance, if the
client is contacting the server for the first time, then the
client’s state is set to client_initial. If the handshake fails,
then the client’s state is set to client_handshake_failed.
If the handshake has to be skipped, then it sets the client’s
state to client_post_handshake.
7Algorithm 1: Server-agent APIs and functions
1 function main()
2 /* Initialize tx and rx queues */
3 initialize_rx_tx_msg_queue();
4 is_client = false;
5 while true do
6 if event = process_packet then
7 if packet must be transmitted then
8 action_flag = send;
9 else
10 int sock =recvfrom();
11 client_info.sock = sock;
12 process_rx_packets();
13 else if event = client_disconnect ‖ socket_timeout then
14 disconnect socket;
15 break;
16 function process_rx_packets()
17 while rx_message_queue do
18 quic_input_message();
19 return;
20 function quic_input_message()
21 if !(handshake_completed) then
22 if !(do_handshake()) then
23 client_state = client_handshake_failed;
24 return error;
25 else
26 client_state = client_initial;
27 else
28 client_state = client_post_handshake ;
29 do_handshake_once();
30 return;
D. Client-agent
This section deals with the APIs and functions specifically
used by the client-agent. Algorithm 2 shows the client agent
implementation.
1) main(): Similar to the server-agent, the main() func-
tion initializes both the transmit and receive queues by calling
initialize_rx_tx_queue(). The client-agent is also event-
driven and processes both incoming and outgoing packets
based on the packet_process event. The main() function
checks action_flag to determine if the packet is meant to
be sent or processed by process_rx_packets().
2) mqtt_message_initializer(): This API creates an
MQTT client instance via MQTTClient_create() and sets
the client ID, the persistence parameter (retained), and the
server IP address. When a subscriber connects to a broker,
it creates subscriptions for all the topics it is interested in.
When a reboot or reconnect event occurs, the client needs
to subscribe again. This is perfectly normal if the client has
not created any persistent sessions. The persistence parameter
creates a persistent session if the client intends to regain all
the subscribed topics after a reconnection or reboot event.
Immediately after the creation of a
client instance, a message is initialized by
MQTTClient_connectOptions_initializer().
This API sets the msgid, dup, retained,
payload and version fields of this packet.
MQTTClient_connectOptions_initializer() creates
a directory to store all the topics and includes this in
Algorithm 2: Client-agent APIs and functions
1 function main()
2 initialize_tx_rx_msg_queue();
3 is_client = true;
4 while true do
5 if event = process_packet then
6 if packet must be transmitted then
7 int sock =create_udp_socket();
8 action_flag = send;
9 mqtt_message_initializer();
10 else
11 insert(rx_msg_queue);
12 process rx_msg_queue for received packets;
13 else if event = client_disconnect ‖ socket_timeout then
14 disconnect socket;
15 break;
16 function mqtt_message_initializer()
17 if (!MQTTClient_create()) then
18 return error;
19 if (!MQTTClient_connectOptions_initializer()) then
20 return error;
21 if (!mqtt_client_connect()) then
22 return error;
23 return;
24 function mqtt_client_connect()
25 if !(sanity(this→ msg)) then
26 return error;
27 initialize_quic();
28 return;
29 function initialize_quic()
30 /* filling quic header */
31 if !(client→ cid) then
32 client→ cid = get_cid(); /*Assign cid to client */
33 populate_quic_header();
34 start_connect();
35 return;
36 function start_connect()
37 quic_stream_gen();
38 if !(handshake_completed) then
39 do_handshake();
40 else
41 do_handshake_once();
42 return;
43 function quic_stream_gen()
44 /* Check stream presence */
45 if stream_present then
46 if if_stream_closed then
47 clear_entry();
48 return error;
49 else
50 /* Find stream */
51 stream =find_stream();
52 else
53 /* Create a stream and associate it with the cid*/
54 stream→ cid = cid;
55 stream =create_stream_buf();
56 return;
client_info to be easily retrieved later.
3) mqtt_client_connect(): At this point, all the mes-
sage construction functionalities related to MQTT are com-
pleted, and finally the client instance is ready for QUIC related
operations. Sanity checking (e.g., header size, data length,
etc.) is performed before entering the main QUIC API (i.e.,
initialize_quic()).
8Algorithm 3: Common APIs and functions
1 function do_handshake()
2 if !(protocol_connect) then
3 return error;
4 handshake_completed = true;
5 if !(do_handshake_once()) then
6 return error;
7 return;
8 function do_handshake_once()
9 if action_flag = send then
10 flag = encrypt ;
11 else
12 flag = decrypt ;
13 if !(crypt_quic_message()) then
14 return error;
15 return;
16 function crypt_quic_message()
17 if flag = decrypt then
18 this→ msg = decrypt_message(this→ msg);
19 quic_dispatcher();
20 else if flag = encrypt then
21 this→ msg = encrypt_message(this→ msg);
22 insert(this→ msg, tx_msg_queue);
23 return;
24 function protocol_connect()
25 if session files not found then
26 connect(); /* 1-RTT Implementation */
27 else
28 resume(); /* 0-RTT Implementation */
29 return;
30 function quic_dispatcher()
31 if is_client then
32 /* If the client is calling the API */
33 process rx_msg_queue for mqtt application;
34 return;
35 else
36 /* MQTT parsing for received messages */
37 if (valid_mqtt_header(this→ msg)) then
38 mqtt_parse_args (this→ msg);
39 return;
40 else
41 return error;
42 return;
4) initialize_quic(): This API first determines if the
client has an assigned cid, and if not, then a new cid is
generated by {0, 1}64 $−→ cid. The QUIC header is initialized
after cid assignment. The non-encrypted part of the QUIC
header consists of cid, diversification nonce, packet number or
sequence number, pointer to payload, size of the payload, size
of the total packet, QUIC version, flags and encryption level.
The encrypted part of the QUIC header is made of frames,
where each frame has a stream ID and a final offset of a
stream. The final offset is calculated as a number of octets in
a transmitted stream. Generally, it is the offset to the end of
the data, marked as the FIN flag and carried in a stream frame.
However, for the reset stream, it is carried in a RST_STREAM
frame [37]. Function populate_quic_header() fills both
the encrypted and non-encrypted parts of the QUIC header
and enters the API start_connect() to connect the client.
5) start_connect(): This API is the entering point to
the common APIs (described in Section III-E). Its first task is
to find an appropriate stream for the connection. Based on the
Algorithm 3: Common APIs and functions (continued)
1 function encrypt_message()
2 if !(handshake_completed) then
3 /* Initial session key is used */
4 get_iv(H, ik)→ iv;
5 if iv was used then
6 return ⊥;
7 else
8 /* For client */
9 if is_client then
10 return (H, E(ikc, iv, H, m);
11 /* For server */
12 else
13 return (H, E(iks, iv, H, m);
14 else
15 /* The stored established key is used */
16 get_iv(H, k)→ iv;
17 if iv is used then
18 return ⊥;
19 /* For client */
20 if is_client then
21 return (H, E(kc, iv, H, m);
22 /* For server */
23 else
24 return (H, E(ks, iv, H, m);
25 function decrypt_message()
26 /* Extracting ciphertext*/
27 m→ ci;
28 if !(handshake_completed) then
29 /* initial data phase key is used */
30 get_iv(H, ik)→ iv;
31 /* For client */
32 if is_client then
33 if D(ikc, iv, H, ci) 6= ⊥ then
34 return plain_text;
35 else
36 return ⊥;
37 else
38 /* For Server */
39 if D(iks, iv, H, ci) 6= ⊥ then
40 return plain_text;
41 else
42 /* Final data phase key is used */
43 get_iv(H, k)→ iv;
44 /* For client */
45 if is_client then
46 if D(kc, iv, H, ci) 6= ⊥ then
47 return plain_text;
48 else
49 return ⊥;
50 else
51 /* For server */
52 if D(ks, iv, H, ci) 6= ⊥ then
53 return plain_text;
handshake_completed flag, start_connect() API deter-
mines if the client and server have completed the handshake. If
the handshake has been completed, then it means that QUIC
connection is alive and data can be encrypted or decrypted.
If not, then it enters the handshake process by executing the
do_handshake() API.
6) quic_stream_gen(): The only purpose of this API is
to detect and create streams. As mentioned earlier, QUIC is
capable of multiplexing several streams into one socket. This
API first detects whether there is already an open stream for
9Algorithm 4: 1-RTT Implementation
1 function connect()
2 if initial_key_exchange() then
3 if initial_data() then
4 if key_settlement() then
5 if final_data() then
6 return success;
7 return error;
8 function initial_key_exchange()
9 message m;
10 /* For client */
11 if is_client then
12 switch phase do
13 case initial do
14 /* pk is public key */
15 c_i_hello(pk)→ m1;
16 break;
17 case received_reject do
18 /* m2 received packet from server (REJ) */
19 c_hello(m2)→ m3;
20 break;
21 case complete_connection_establishment do
22 /* ik is initial key variable set during initial phase */
23 get_i_key_c(m3)→ ik;
24 break;
25 /* For server */
26 else
27 switch phase do
28 case received_chlo do
29 s_reject(m1) → m2;
30 break;
31 case received_complete_chlo do
32 get_i_key_s(m3) → ik;
33 break;
34 return;
35 function initial_data()
36 /* For client */
37 if is_client then
38 for each α ∈ [i];
39 α + 2 →sqnc;
40 /* sqnc = Client sequence number */
41 /* Mαc = Client constructed message */
42 pak(ik, sqnc, Mαc ) → mα4 ;
43 process_packets(ik,m5);
44 /* For server */
45 else
46 for each β ∈ [j];
47 β + 1 → sqns;
48 /* sqns = Server sequence number*/
49 /* Mαs = Server constructed message */
50 pak(ik, sqns,Mβs ) → m;
51 process_packets(ik,m4);
52 return;
a particular client, and if not, then it creates a new stream by
running create_stream_buf().
E. Common APIs and functions
Several APIs and functions such as encryption, decryption
and processing transmission packets are mandated on both the
server and client sides. Although the packets handled by these
functions are different in the client-agent and server-agent, the
underlying mechanisms are almost similar. Algorithm 3 shows
the implementation.
Algorithm 4: 1-RTT Implementation (continued)
1 function key_settlement()
2 if is_client then
3 get_key_c(m6, sqns) → k;
4 else
5 2 + j → sqns;
6 s_hello(m, ik, sqns) → m6;
7 get_key_s(m6) → k;
8 return;
9 function final_data()
10 if is_client then
11 for each α ∈ {i + 1,...,u}
12 α + 2 →sqnc;
13 pak(k, sqnc, Mαc )→ mα7 ;
14 (mi+17 ......m
u)→ m7;
15 process_packets(k,m7);
16 else
17 for each β ∈ {j + 1,...,w}
18 β + 2 →sqns;
19 pak(k, sqns, Mβs ) → mβ8 ;
20 (mj+18 ......m
w)→ m8;
21 process_packets(k, m8);
22 return;
1) do_handshake(): This API is the starting point of the
QUIC connection establishment and key exchange process.
It behaves as an abstraction of the handshake process. First,
it calls protocol_connect() for protocol communication.
If protocol_connect() is executed successfully, then the
handshake_completed flag is set. Based on this flag, the client
determines whether to execute the handshake process or skip
it. Lastly, this API calls the do_handshake_once() API to
set the encrypt or decrypt flag for further processing.
2) do_handshake_once(): The primary responsibility of
this API is to set the encryption or decryption flags. This
decision is made based on the type of the next operation,
which is transmission or processing. If action_flag is set, then
the packet must be encrypted and sent. Finally, it enters the
crypt_quic_message() API.
3) crypt_quic_message(): This API is the
starting point in establishing a secure connection. It
checks the flag to determine if the packet should
undergo decryption (decrypt_message()) or encryption
(encrypt_message()).
4) protocol_connect(): In this API, the client (C)
checks the existence of a session file to determine whether
it has communicated with the server (S) during the last τt
seconds. If C and S are interacting for the first time, then
the connect() API completes the 1-RTT scenario in four
phases, as shown in Figure 5 and Algorithm 4. If C and S
have communicated before, then the resume() API follows
the 0-RTT scenario shown in Figure 6 and Algorithm 7.
1-RTT Connection. The 1-RTT implementation is divided
into four phases. The first phase exchanges the initial keys
to encrypt the handshake packets until the final key is set.
The second phase starts exchanging encrypted initial data. The
third phase sets the final key. Last, the fourth phase starts
exchanging the final data. We explain the details of these
phases as follows.
[1-RTT]: Phase 1. This phase is handled by
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Client
mc , pkj
Server
ms
Send m1 = c_i_hello(pkj)
Send m2 = s_reject(m1)
Send m3 = c_hello(m2) } initial_key_exchange
Send m4 = pak(ik, sqnc, mc)
Send m5 = pak(ik, sqns, ms) } initial_data
Send m6 = s_hello(m3, ik, sqns)
key_settlement
Send m7 = pak(k, sqnc, mc)
Send m8 = pak(ks, sqns, ms)
Server key 
ks:get_key_s(m6)Client key 
kc:get_key_c(m6,sqns)
}
} final_data
Fig. 5. The four phases of the 1-RTT connection.
Algorithm 5: Server Configuration State
1 function get_scfg(sk, τt, λ)
2 Za−1
$−→ xs;
3 bxs −→ ys;
4 (b, a, ys)→pubs;
5 xs →secs;
6 τt+1 →expy;
7 H(pubs, expy) →scid; /* H is a SHA-256 function */
8 "QUIC Server Config Signature" → str;
9 Sign(sk, (str, 0x00, scid, pubs, expy))→prof;
10 (scid, pubs, expy) →scfgtpub;
11 return scfg;
initial_key_exchange() and consists of three messages,
m1,m2 and m3. The client C runs c_i_hello(pk), which
returns a packet m1 with sequence number 1. m1 is an initial
connection packet sent to S, containing a randomly generated
cid. In response to m1, S sends a REJ packet m2, generated
using s_reject(m1). m2 contains a source-address token
stk (similar to TLS session tickets [53]), which is later used
by C to prove its identity to S for the ongoing session and
future sessions. This is performed by checking if the source
IP address equals the IP address in stk. Fundamentally, the
stk consists of an encryption block of C’s IP address and
a timestamp. In order to generate stk, S uses the same E
deterministic algorithm (i.e., AEAD) with kstk (derived by
{0, 1}128 $−→ kstk). The initialization vector for stk (i.e.,
ivstk) is selected randomly and is used in s_reject. For
simplicity, we implemented a validity range for stk, which
is bounded by the time period during which it was either
generated or set up. Another important parameter in m2 is the
S′s current state scfg_pub (refer to Algorithm 5). It contains
S’s DH values with an expiration date and a signature prof.
This signature is signed by SS over all the public values
under the S′s secret key sk.
Upon receiving m2, the client C checks scfgtpub for its
authenticity and expiration. The algorithms for this purpose
can be found in [52]. As we mentioned in Section III-B,
our implementation assumes that a PKI is in place. After
possessing the public key of S, the client generates a nonc
and DH values by running c_hello(m2), and sends them
to the server in message m3. At this point, both C and S
derive the initial key material ik, using get_i_key_c(m3)
and get_i_key_s(m3), respectively. The server keeps track
of the used nonc values in order to make sure that it does not
process the same connection twice. This mechanism is referred
as strike-register or strike. The timestamp is included in the
nonc by the client. The server only maintains the state of
a connection for a limited duration of time. Any connection
request from a client is rejected by the server if its nonc is
already included in its strike or contains a timestamp that
is outside the permitted range strikerng . The initial key ik
= (ikc, iks, iv) is made of two parts: two 128-bit application
keys (ikc, iks) and two 4-byte initialization vector prefixes
iv = (ivc, ivs). The client uses iks and ivs to encrypt
the data and send it to S. On the other hand ikc and ivc
assist in decryption and encryption. This phase happens only
once during the time period τt until scfgtpub and stk are not
expired.
[1-RTT]: Phase 2. This phase is handled by
initial_data() and consists of two messages, m4
and m5. The client C and server S exchange the initial data
message Mc and Ms, which are encrypted and authenticated
with ik in function pak(ik,sqnc, M iα) for every α ∈ [i]
and pak(ik, sqns, M iβ) for every β ∈ [j], respectively.
Here, sqnc and sqns represent the sequence number of
packets sent by C and S, respectively. i and j represent
the maximum number of message blocks that C and S can
exchange prior to the first phase. The initialization vector iv
is generated based on the server or client role. When S sends
a packet, get_iv() outputs iv by concatenating ivc and
sqns. When C sends a packet, get_iv() generates iv by
concatenating ivs and sqnc. The total length of each iv is
12 bytes since both the server and client initialization vector
prefixes (i.e., ivc and ivs) are 4 bytes in length and sequence
numbers (i.e., sqns and sqnc) are 8 bytes in length. When
C receives packets from S, it uses the process_packets()
function to decrypt those packets to extract their payloads
and concatenates them based on their sequence number.
The server S performs a similar mechanism for the packets
received from C.
[1-RTT]: Phase 3. This phase is handled by
key_settlement() and involves message m6. The server
S produces new DH values (authenticated and encrypted
via AEAD with ik) and transmits them to the client using
s_hello(m3,ik, sqn). The client verifies the server’s new
DH public values with the help of ik. At this point, the server
and client both derive the session key by get_key_s(m6)
and get_key_c(m6) and use extract_expand() for key
expansion, as defined in Algorithm 6.
[1-RTT]: Phase 4. This phase is handled by final_data()
and consists of two messages, m7 and m8. Instead of initial
key ik, the established key k is used to encrypt and authen-
ticate the remaining data (Msg) by both C and S. Similar to
ik, k is derived from kc, ks, and iv, and consists of two
parts: the two 128-bit application keys (kc, ks) and the two
4-bytes initialization vector prefixes iv = (ivc,ivs). In order
to encrypt the data, C uses ks and ivs before sending to S.
For decryption, C uses ivc and kc to decrypt the data received
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Algorithm 6: QUIC messages exchange APIs and func-
tions
1 function c_i_hello(pk)
2 {0, 1}64 $−→cid;
3 return {IPc, IPs, portc, ports, cid, 1};
4 function s_reject(m)
5 {0, 1}96 $−→ivstk;
6 (ivstk , E(kstk , ivstk , , 0) ‖ (IPc, current_times))→ stk;
7 return {IPs,IPc,ports,portc,cid,1,scfgtpub, prof, stk};
8 /* prof is generated by get_scfg */
9 function c_hello(m)
10 if expy ≤ τt then
11 return;
12 str = ”QUIC server config signature”;
13 if Ver(pk, (str, 0X00,scid, pubs, expy), prof)) 6= 1; then
14 return;
15 {0, 1}160 $−→ r;
16 (current_timec, r)→ nonc;
17 Za−1
$−→ xc, bxc → yc, (b, a, yc)→ pubc;
18 (IPc, IPs, portc, ports)→ pkt_info;
19 return (pkt_info, cid, 2, stk, scid, nonc, pubc);
20 function get_i_key_c(m)
21 yxcs
$−→ipm;
22 return extract_expand(ipm, nonc, cid, m, 40, 1)
23 function get_i_key_s(m)
24 stk→(ivstk , tk);
25 D(kstk, ivstk, , tk)→ d;
26 if (d = ⊥ ‖ ( first 4 bytes of d 6= 0) then
27 if ( first 4 bytes of d) 6= IPc) then
28 return;
29 return;
30 if last 4 bytes corresponds to outside strikerng then
31 return;
32 if r ∈ strike ‖ τt /∈ strikerng then
33 return;
34 if scid is unknown then
35 return;
36 if scid corresponds to expired scfgt
‘
pub then
37 /* where t‘ < t */
38 return;
39 if b, a ∈ pubc 6= b, a ∈ pubs then
40 return;
41 yxsc →ipm;
42 return extract_expand(ipm,nonc,cid,m,40,1);
43 function extract_expand(ipm, nonc, cid, m, l, init)
44 HMAC(nonc,ipm)→ ms;
45 if init = 1 then
46 ”QUIC key expansion”→ str;
47 else
48 ”QUIC forward secure key expansion”→ str;
49 (str, 0X00, cid, m, scfgtpub) →info;
50 return first l bytes (octets) of T = (T(1), T(2),...),
51 if all i ∈ N, T(i) = HMAC(ms, (T(i-1), info, 0x0i)) and
T(0) = 
from S.
0-RTT Connection. Another scenario of connection es-
tablishment is 0-RTT, as Figure 6 shows. If C has already
established a connection with S in the past τt seconds, then C
skips sending c_i_hello(), and initiates another connection
request to the server by sending a c_hello() packet. This
packet contains the existing values of stk, scid, cid, nonc,
and pubc. It is important to note that pubc requires new DH
ephemeral public values. After receiving c_hello, S verifies
Algorithm 6: QUIC messages exchange APIs and func-
tions (continued)
1 function get_iv(H,κ)
2 /* κc = Client key,
3 * κs = Server key
4 * ivc = Client initialization vector,
5 * ivs = Server initialization vector */
6 κ→ (κc, κs, ivc, ivs);
7 if is_client then
8 c→ src, s→ dst;
9 else
10 s→ src, c→ dst;
11 /* sqn is packet sequence number */
12 H →(cid, sqn);
13 return (ivdst, sqn);
14 function pak(k, sqn, m)
15 κ→ (kc, ks,ivc, ivs);
16 if is_client then
17 c→ src and s→ dst;
18 else
19 s→ src and c→ dst;
20 (IPsrc, IPdst, portsrc, portdst) → pkt_info;
21 (cid, sqn)→ H;
22 get_iv(H,κ)→ iv;
23 return (pkt_info, E(kdst,iv,H , (1 ‖ m)));
24 function process_packets(κ, p1, p2....pv)
25 κ→ (kc, ks, ivc, ivs);
26 if is_client then
27 c→ src and s→ dst;
28 else
29 s→ src and c→ dst;
30 for each γ ∈ [v] :
31 pγ → (Hγ , cγ);
32 get_iv(Hγ , κ)→ ivγ ;
33 D(ksrc, ivγ , Hγ , cγ)→ mγ;
34 if mγ /∈ Msg then
35 return
36 return (m1, m2, .... mv);
37 function s_hello(m3, ik, sqn )
38 ik → (ikc, iks, ivc, ivs);
39 Za−1
$−→ x˜s, bx˜s → y˜s, (b, a, y˜s)→ pu˜bs;
40 (cid, sqn)→ H;
41 E(ikc, (ivc, sqn), H, (0 ‖ (pu˜bs, stk)))→ e;
42 return (ips,ipc,ports,portc, H , e);
43 function get_key_s(m)
44 yx˜sc →pms;
45 return extract_expand(pms, nonc, cid, m, 40, 0);
46 function get_key_c(m)
47 m→(IPs,IPc,ports, portc, cid, sqn, e);
48 if D(ikc,(ivc, sqn),(cid,sqn),e) = ⊥ then
49 return
50 if first bit of the message 6= 0 then
51 return
52 y˜xcs → pms;
53 return extract_expand(pms, nonc, cid, m, 40, 0);
if the nonc is fresh. This is performed against strike-register,
provided that stk is valid and scid is not unknown or expired.
If these verification steps do not succeed, then S returns to the
1-RTT process by generating and sending out a s_reject
message (Algorithm 6). If these verification steps succeed,
then the rest of the protocol remains the same. Algorithm 7
shows the implementation for 0-RTT.
5) quic_dispatcher(): This API is the starting point
where MQTT-related parsing starts. After the QUIC header is
12
Algorithm 7: 0-RTT Implementation
1 function resume()
2 if (pubc) then
3 if stk then
4 if scid then
5 return c_hello(stk, scfgtpub);
6 /* Jumping back on 1-RTT */
7 return connect();
8 function c_hello(stk, scfgtpub)
9 {0, 1}64 $−→cid;
10 {0, 1}160 $−→ r, (current_timec, r) → nonc;
11 Za−1
$−→ xc, bxc → yc, (b, a, yc)→ pubc;
12 (IPc, IPs,portc,ports)→pkt_info;
13 return (pkt_info, cid, 1, stk, scid, nonc, pubc)
Client
mc , pkj
Server
ms
Send m3 = c_hello(stk, scfgpubt)
} initial_dataSend m6 = s_hello(m3, ik, sqns)
key_settlement
Send m7 = pak(k, sqnc, mc)
Send m8 = pak(ks, sqns, ms)
Server key 
ks:get_key_s(m6)Client key 
kc:get_key_c(m6,sqns) }
} final_data
Fig. 6. In 0-RTT scenario, client sends the first packet c_hello with previous
server global state scfg and strike. This step itself sends initial data to server.
stripped off and decrypted, the packet is delivered to MQTT.
Here, the broker finds the topic and delivers the message to
all the subscribers that have subscribed to that topic.
F. Code Reduction
QUIC is a part of the Chromium Projects [33]. These
projects have a heavy code size because they include sev-
eral features such as the Chrome browser, SPDY protocol,
Chromecast, Native Client, and QUIC with their entwined
implementations. In order to reduce the code size, we have
removed all these features except those that are essential
to the functionality of QUIC. Furthermore, to reduce its
overhead, most of the logging features have been removed
or disabled. We have also eliminated alarm_factory, which
generates platform-specific alarms. The host resolver has been
removed as well. As most clients have an in-built DNS pre-
fetching [54] feature, they can resolve DNS queries without
having to communicate with a server. Since MQTT routes
data flows based on topics instead of URLs, this feature is not
required. We have also removed the backend proxy-related
code. Backend proxy is used when the proxy server is behind
the firewall and load balances the requests from clients to the
servers. Since MQTT is based on the publish/subscribe model,
it is futile to involve any proxy or load balancing. Finally, we
removed all the unit-testing code.
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Fig. 7. The three testbeds used for the performance evaluations.
IV. EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation of
MQTTw/QUIC versus MQTTw/TCP.
In order to measure the impact of the physical layer and
distance on performance, three different testbeds are used:
wired, wireless, and long-distance.
– Wired. All the nodes are connected to a Netgear 1Gbps
L2-learning switch.
– Wireless. The nodes communicate through an 802.11n
network. The access point used is a Linksys AC1200 and
operates on channel 6 of the 2.4GHz band. In addition,
we placed two other similar access points 3 meters away
form the main access point. In order to introduce latency
and packet drops, these two access points operate on the
same channel and therefore interfere with the main access
point. Each interfering access point continuously exchanges
a 10Mbps UDP flow with a nearby user.
– Long Distance. Our objective in using the long-distance
routed network is to introduce longer and unpredictable end-
to-end delays. The subscriber and publisher are placed in
Santa Clara, California, and the broker is situated across
the country in Washington D.C.
Raspberry Pi 3 model B is the device used as the subscriber,
publisher, and broker. These devices run Raspbian Stretch as
their operating system. As mentioned in the previous section,
the MQTT implementation is based on Eclipse Paho and
Mosquitto. In addition, the TLS version is 1.2, the socket
timeout for TCP and QUIC is 30 seconds, and the keep-alive
mechanism of MQTT has been disabled. Figure 7 shows these
testbeds.
When presenting the results, each point is the median of
values obtained in 10 experiments, where each experiment
includes 10 iterations. For example, when measuring the
overhead of connection re-establishment, the subscriber and
publisher are connected to the broker 10 times, and the result
is counted as one experiment. The iterations of an experiment
are run consecutively, and the minimum time interval between
the experiments is 5 minutes.
The rest of this section studies the performance of
MQTTw/QUIC versus MQTTw/TCP in terms of the overhead
of connection establishment, head-of-line blocking, half-open
connections, resource utilization, and connection migration.
A. Overhead of Connection Establishment
This section evaluates the number of packets exchanged be-
tween devices when using MQTTw/TCP and MQTTw/QUIC
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Fig. 8. The connection establishment process using (a) MQTTw/TCP, (b)
MQTTw/QUIC 1-RTT, and (c) MQTTw/QIUC 0-RTT.
during the connection establishment process. Before present-
ing the results, we first study the sequence of packet exchanges
between a client and a server. Figures 8(a), (b), and (c)
show this sequence in MQTTw/TCP and MQTTw/QUIC’s 1-
RTT, and 0-RTT, respectively. Please note that these figures
demonstrate ideal scenarios when there is no packet drop. In
addition, MQTT ping packets are excluded to simplify the
evaluations. Figure 9 and Table II summarize the results from
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Fig. 9. The number of packets exchanged during the connection establish-
ment phase in the wired, wireless, and long-distance testbeds. The error bars
show the lower quartile and higher quartile of the collected results.
the subscriber, publisher and broker point of views using the
three testbed types mentioned earlier.
As the results show, MQTTw/QUIC reduces the number
of packets exchanged with the broker by up to 56.25%. In
addition, the wireless testbed shows the highest performance
improvement compared to the other two testbeds, which is due
to its higher packet loss rate. Therefore, since the number of
packets required by MQTTw/QUIC is lower in this scenario,
compared to MQTTw/TCP, the total number of packet re-
transmissions is lower. Compared to the wired testbed, the
long-distance testbed shows a higher performance improve-
ment. In the wired network, all the three devices are in same
broadcast domain, therefore, no layer-3 routing is performed.
This an ideal situation since all the devices are connected
directly through a LAN and the probability of packet loss is
almost zero. However, packets might be lost or significantly
delayed in the long-distance testbed due to events such as
congestion and multipath. As IoT applications such as smart
homes usually include lossy links, these results indicate the
significant potential benefits of using QUIC in these scenarios.
B. Head-of-Line Blocking
The head-of-line blocking problem occurs when the receiver
is waiting for the dropped packets to be re-transmitted in order
to complete the packet reordering before delivering them to
the application. To simulate this problem in our testbeds, a
FreeBSD [55] router was introduced in between the publisher
and broker.
FreeBSD enables us to intercept packets based on the fire-
wall rules and their network buffers. During this experiment,
which ran for 300 seconds, data packets are intercepted based
on their flow ID. The flow ID is a unique tuple of source
IP address and source port to identify the connection. The
FreeBSD’s firewall function ipfw_chk is used to intercept
the packets and drop them. In order to replicate a real-
world scenario, data packets were dropped randomly at fixed
intervals. For instance, to simulate a 10% drop scenario, every
10th packet belonging to the same ID is dropped. In these
experiments, latency is computed as the interval between the
instance a packet leaves the publisher until the reception of
that packet by the subscriber. To accurately measure latency
without introducing extra traffic, WiringPi [56] has been
integrated into our testbed. For each received message, the
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OF MQTTW/QUIC VERSUS MQTTW/TCP IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF PACKETS EXCHANGED DURING THE
CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT PHASE.
Testbed Wired Wireless Long Distance
Device Subscriber Publisher Broker Subscriber Publisher Broker Subscriber Publisher Broker
1-RTT 36.84% 33.33% 35.29% 48.18% 42.85% 47.91% 45.83% 35.29% 40%Improvement
vs MQTTw/TCP 0-RTT 47.36% 46.66% 47.05% 55.55% 52.38% 56.25% 54.16% 47.05% 50%
receiver uses the WiringPi library to notify the sender by
generating a signal to toggle a pin connected to the sender.
Table III summarizes the results for all the three testbeds.
Dropping random packets intermittently forces the sender to
retransmit the lost packets. As the results show, TCP’s latency
is higher than QUIC’s in all the scenarios. This is due to the
packet re-ordering delay in TCP, which happens when a line
of packets is being held up by the receiver when prior packets
are lost. In contrast, QUIC is based on UDP, which does not
hold up the received packets while the lost packets are being
re-transmitted. This enables the receiver’s application layer to
perform the decryption operation as soon as packets arrive.
In the wireless and long distance testbeds, apart from
the intentional drops introduced, both MQTTw/QUIC and
MQTTw/TCP show higher latencies as they suffer from the
additional packet drops, compared to the wired testbed. There-
fore, the improvement margins between MQTTw/TCP and
MQTTw/QUIC in wireless and long distance testbeds are
lower than the wired network. For example, for the 10% drop
rate scenario, MQTTw/QUIC reported 1.3833 ms and 7.1099
ms latencies in the wired and wireless testbeds, respectively.
Therefore, the highest improvement achieved is for wired
networks.
C. TCP Half-Open Connections
An act of receiving data in TCP is passive, which means
that a dropped connection can only be detected by the sender
and not by the receiver. In order to simulate the TCP half-
open connection problem, 100 connections were established
by 10 publishers using different topics and client IDs. One
message is transmitted per second over each connection. To
generate TCP half-open connections, the keep-alive message
transmission mechanism of MQTT has been disabled. The
half-open connections are detected using Linux command ss
-a. In order to reveal the overhead of half-open connections,
memory usage and processor utilization level were measured
using the Linux’s top utility. To generate half-open connec-
tions, all the publishers are restarted in the middle of a message
flow. In this scenario, the broker is unaware of the connection
tear-down.
Figures 10 and 11 show the resource utilization of the
broker. Both figures present the results of a single experiment
to reveal the variations of memory and processor utilization
versus time. The duration of this experiment is long enough to
include the process of client connection, subscription, publish-
ing, and restart of the clients. After each of the aforementioned
operations, we wait for the processor and memory utilization
to become stable and then start the next operation. These
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Fig. 10. The memory utilization of broker. While the memory utilization
level of MQTTw/QUIC is dropped after the publishers were restarted, the
memory utilization of MQTTw/TCP remains high.
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Fig. 11. The processor utilization of broker. Although the processor
utilization of MQTTw/QUIC is more than MQTTw/TCP, after the publishers
were restarted, MQTTw/QUIC shows a higher drop in processor usage as
QUIC runs over UDP and does not require any connection state information.
results shows that MQTTw/QUIC releases the resources as
soon as it detects the connection is broken. Specifically, the
MQTTw/QUIC’s UDP socket times out under 1 minute and
QUIC starts its draining period. On the other hand, TCP
connections still wait for incoming packets, as there is no
mechanism to detect whether the connections opened by the
publishers are still active or not. In summary, it is observed that
MQTTw/QUIC reduces processor utilization between 74.67%
to 83.24% and lowers memory utilization between 45.52%
to 50.32%, compared to MQTTw/TCP. It must be noted
that MQTTw/QUIC achieves these improvements without in-
troducing any communication overheads such as keep-alive
packets.
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OF MQTTW/QUIC VERSUS MQTTW/TCP IN TERMS OF PACKET DELIVERY LATENCY IN THE PRESENCE OF PACKET
DROPS. THE DROP RATE IS CHANGED BETWEEN 10% TO 50%.
Testbed Wired Wireless Long Distance
Drop Rate 10% 20% 50% 10% 20% 50% 10% 20% 50%
Latency of
MQTTw/TCP 3.114 ms 5.234 ms 10.6904 ms 11.2176 ms 15.7451 ms 21.4137 ms 44.3578 ms 54.9340 ms 75.6283 ms
Latency of
MQTTw/QUIC 1.3833 ms 3.5680 ms 8.9389 ms 7.1099 ms 10.5313 ms 18.5313 ms 33.0088 ms 44.0462 ms 64.3635 ms
Improvement
vs MQTTw/TCP 55.57% 31.83% 16.38% 36.61 % 33.11% 13.46% 25.58% 19.81% 14.89%
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Fig. 12. The effect of connection migration on throughput. After each IP
renewal, TCP re-establishes the connections. In contrast, QUIC connections
are survived and only a slight throughput degradation can be observed due to
the change in interface IP address.
D. Connection Migration
As mentioned earlier, connection reestablishment due to
roaming imposes energy overhead. This section evaluates the
efficiency of the proposed system during connection migra-
tions. To this end, 100 connections were established from 10
publishers to a broker, and the subscribers were subscribed
to all the topics. The nload utility was used to measure
throughput. In order to emulate the change of network, the IP
address of the broker’s interface connected to the subscriber is
changed every 5 minutes. The total duration of the experiment
is 16 minutes to include three connection reestablishment
triggers and allow the publishers and broker to stabilize after
each migration.
Figure 12 shows the results. Whenever a change in the
connection parameters occurs, MQTTw/TCP has to repeat the
cumbersome process of connection re-establishment. In this
case, its bandwidth drops to zero and picks up again after
the connection re-establishment process completes. In contrast,
MQTTw/QUIC’s throughput shows a slight reduction due to
the change in the interface state, but connections were mi-
grated to the new IP unscathed. Specifically, QUIC allows the
end point devices to survive in such events, requiring only to
have a stable IP address during the handshake process to obtain
the 1-RTT keys. This feature is particularly useful in mobile
IoT scenarios such as medical and industrial applications [8].
Another useful case is to make the clients resilient against
NAT rebinding.
V. RELATED WORK
This section is composed of two sub-sections. The first sub-
section reviews the IoT application layer protocols and their
employed transport layer protocols. The second sub-section
reviews the literature relevant to QUIC and compares the fea-
tures offered by the proposed MQTTw/QUIC implementation
against existing IoT application layer protocols.
A. IoT Application Layer Protocols
This section overviews the main IoT application layer
protocols and their adoption of transport layer protocols.
1) MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport): MQTT
is a lightweight IoT application protocol for machine-to-
machine connectivity. The protocol specification [27] man-
dates the use of a connection-oriented transport protocol to
ensure packet ordering and reliable delivery. Therefore, most
implementations [35], [57]–[60] use TCP/IP with TLS/SSL to
satify this requirement. In some cases [61], the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP), an alternative to TCP, has been
used as well. However, the key problems with SCTP when
used in IoT domains are: (i) 4-way handshake, which increases
latency compared to the TCP’s 3-way handshake. (ii) SCTP
is mainly used for multihoming and redundancy. Whereas in
IoT, redundancy is not an essential aspect compared to latency.
(iii) SCTP is not suitable for heterogeneous networks [62]. The
authors in [63] studied TCP, UDP and SCTP, and justified why
SCTP is not the best fit as an IoT protocol.
2) XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol):
XMPP offers both publish/subscribe (asynchronous) and re-
quest/response (synchronous) messaging capabilities. This
protocol uses TLS/SSL for security, and relies on TCP to en-
sure reliability. XMPP is most suited for real-time applications,
with small message footprints and low latency in message
exchange [64]. Although XMPP is preferred over CoAP in
data-centric IoT scenarios due to offering the publish/subscribe
mechanism, the lack of QoS provisioning might not be
acceptable in mission-ciritical applications. Furthermore, its
underlying transport protocol, TCP, inherits the shortcomings
we discussed earlier. Google has reported various XMPP
incompatibilities with their new applications [65] and declared
it as an obsolete protocol.
3) REST (Representational State Transfer): REST is an
architectural paradigm. REST uses the HTTP [66] methods
(GET, POST, PUT and DELETE) to provide a resource-
oriented messaging system. All actions are performed by
simple request/response (synchronous) HTTP commands. It
has a built-in accept HTTP header to determine the format of
the data, which is usually JSON (JavaScript Object Notation)
or XML (Extensible Markup Language). REST is easy to
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implement and is supported by most M2M cloud platforms.
Other features supported by REST are caching, authentication
and content type negotiation [67]. This protocol, however,
does not offer high energy efficiency since polling must be
performed in order to check the availability of data.
REST provides a one-way connection between the client and
server. Client only connects to the server when it has to either
push or pull the data. On the other hand, MQTT relies on a
two-way established connection between the server and client.
This enables the server to respond to client’s request instantly
[68]. In contrast, since REST is a request/reply protocol, it
does not need to establish a long-term connection. However, in
lossy networks, in particular, establishing connections repeat-
edly increases energy consumption [69]. BevyWise Networks
conducted experiments and estimated that their proprietary
MQTTRoute broker [70] consumes 20% less power than REST.
Their findings concluded that the primary reason behind more
power consumption in REST was due to the resources used
for connecting, re-connecting, and cleaning up both the server
and client connection states. As another example, [68] shows
that MQTT is up to 25 times faster than REST in terms of
data transfer rate.
The availability of a REST server might be limited if
the devices are behind a firewall. A common scenario of
firewall deployment is when all new incoming connections are
blocked, while outgoing connections are always allowed due
to zoning. In this case, establishing connection to IoT devices
would not be possible. MQTT solves this issue by relying on
two-way connections.
4) AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing Protocol): Al-
though AMQP is agnostic to transport protocol, it uses TCP
(and TLS) by default. AMPQ offers a publish/subscribe model
for messaging. This protocol provides a reliable connection by
utilizing a store and forward mechanism [71], [72], thereby
offering reliability in the presence of network disruptions. The
authors in [73] show that AMQP can send a larger amount
of messages per second, compared to REST. Studies show
that AMQP has a low success rate in low bandwidth, but the
success rate increases as bandwidth increases [72], [74].
5) MQTT-SN (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport - Sen-
sor Networks): MQTT-SN is a variant of MQTT, which
is mainly designed for very resource-constrained devices.
Specifically, this protocol aims to reduce the high energy
consumption and bandwidth usage of MQTT networks [75].
Although MQTT-SN can use UDP as its underlying transport
protocol, it is agnostic to the underlying transport services.
Apart from introducing UDP, MQTT-SN also mandates the
inclusion of a gateway (GW) and forwarder. The primary
function of the gateway is to transform UDP packets into
standard MQTT packets and transmit the packets to a broker.
There are two categories for this connection: transparent and
aggregating. Using a transparent gateway, every MQTT-SN
node owns a dedicated TCP connection to the broker. On
the other hand, an aggregating gateway only has one TCP
connection to the broker, which is then used in tunneling.
The forwarder receives MQTT-SN frames on the wireless side,
and encapsulates and forwards them to the gateway. For the
return traffic, frames are decapsulated and sent to the clients
without applying any modifications. MQTT-SN avails DTLS
and TLS to provide security for UDP and TCP, respectively.
Using a gateway is mandatory in MQTT-SN. The authors in
[76] proved MQTT-SN performs 30% faster than CoAP.
6) CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol): CoAP elim-
inates the overhead of TCP by relying on UDP [77], [78], and
DTLS is used to secure the connections. CoAP implements
reliability by defining two bits in each packet header. These
bits determine the type of message and the required Quality of
Service (QoS) level. The authors in [79] show that the delay
of CoAP is higher than MQTT, which is caused by packet
losses when UDP is replaced with TCP.
B. QUIC
Various studies have evaluated the performance of QUIC in
the context of Internet traffic. Google has deployed this proto-
col in its front-end servers that collectively handle billions of
requests per day [14]. Google claims that QUIC outperforms
TCP in a variety of scenarios such as reducing latency by 8%
in Google search for desktop users and 3.6% for mobile users.
In video streaming, latency in YouTube playbacks is reduced
by 18% for desktop and 15.3% for mobile users. Currently,
QUIC is used for 30% of Google’s egress traffic.
In [80], the authors evaluate the performance of multiple
QUIC streams in LTE and WiFi networks. Their experiments
show that for mobile web page, median and 95th percentile
completion time can be improved by up to 59.1% and 72.3%,
respectively, compared to HTTP. The authors in [48] show that
QUIC outperforms TCP with respect to Page Load Time (PLT)
in different desktop user network conditions such as added
delay and loss, variable bandwidth, and mobile environment.
The studies of [81] show that QUIC outperforms TLS when
used in unstable networks such as WiFi [82]. Specifically, the
authors performed experiments to measure PLT for YouTube
traffic with different delays (0ms, 50ms, 100ms and 200ms).
These values were adopted from [83] for QUIC to simulate
real networks. Assuming the PLT is x when the introduced
delay is 0, these observations have been made. For the second
connection, the PLT is doubled, and it is increased by 400ms
for each consecutive connection. However, for HTTP-2 repeat
connections, the PLT is multiplied by the connection number
for each consecutive connection, i.e., 2x, 3x, etc. In another
study [84], the authors showed that in more than 40% of
scenarios the PLT of QUIC is lower than SPDY [85] and TLS
combined.
The authors in [86] have evaluated the performance of
HTTP2 with QUIC for Multi-User Virtual World (MUVW)
and 3D web. MUVW networks mostly run on UDP [87], [88],
and require the network administrator to open 50 or more UDP
ports on the firewall. Since these ports carry UDP traffic, an
application protocol capable of offering connection-orientated
streams and security is required. QUIC is an ideal candidate
to fill this void.
The implementation and integration of QUIC with MQTT
are complementary to the aforementioned studies since none
of them have considered the applicability of QUIC in IoT
applications. Specifically, this work reveals the importance
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF IOT APPLICATION LAYER PROTOCOLS
Protocol CoAP MQTT MQTT-SN XMPP REST AMQP MQTTw/QUIC
UDP Compatible
√
X
√
X X
√ √
TCP Compatible X
√ √ √ √ √
X
Multiplexing Capability X X X X X X
√
0-RTT Capable X X X X X X
√
Fixing Head-of-Line Blocking N/A X X X X X
√
Fixing TCP Half-Open Problem
(Adaptability to Lossy Networks) N/A X X X X X
√
Supporting Connection Migration X X X X X X
√
and benefits of integrating MQTT with QUIC when used in
various types of IoT networks including local, wireless and
long-distance networks. The results presented in this paper, in
particular, confirm 56% lower packet exchange overhead, 83%
lower processor utilization, 50% lower memory utilization, and
55% shorter delivery delay of MQTTw/QUIC compared to
MQTTw/TCP. Table IV compares MQTTw/QUIC versus the
existing application layer protocols.
VI. CONCLUSION
Enhancing transport layer protocols is essential to ensure
compatibility while addressing the particular demands of IoT
networks. Specifically, shifting the implementation of pro-
tocols to the user space brings substantial benefits such as
offloading the cost of modifying the kernel and enhancing
processing speed. In addition, given the resource-constrained
nature of IoT devices, reducing communication overhead is
essential. Unfortunately, these requirements are not satisfied
by TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS.
In this paper, we justified the potential benefits of QUIC
compared to TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS in IoT scenarios and
presented its integration with MQTT protocol. Specifically,
we showed the software architecture proposed as well as
the agents developed to enable the communication between
MQTT and QUIC. Three different testbeds were used to eval-
uate the performance of MQTTw/QUIC versus MQTTw/TCP.
The results confirmed that MQTTw/QUIC reduces connection
establishment overhead, lowers delivery latency, reduces pro-
cessor and memory utilization, and shortens the level and du-
ration of throughput degradation during connection migration
significantly compared to MQTTw/TCP.
Some of the potential areas of future work are as follows:
First, the processor utilization of QUIC is higher than TCP.
This is due to the cost of encryption and packet processing
while maintaining QUIC’s internal state. To reduce the over-
head of encryption, for example, the ChaCha20 optimization
technique could be used [89]. Although packet processing
cost was minimized by using asynchronous packet reception
in the kernel by applying a memory-mapped ring buffer,
a.k.a., PACKET_RX_RING, the cost is still higher than TCP. To
minimize this problem, one solution is to employ kernel bypass
[90]–[92] to bring packet processing into the user space.
Second, the core functionality of QUIC assumes a maximum
MTU of 1392 bytes for handshake packets [93]. This includes
14 bytes for Ethernet header, 20 bytes for IP header, 8 bytes for
UDP, and 1350 bytes for QUIC. At present, the 1392 bytes is a
static value in the client side, which is based on observational
testing. All handshake packets are required to be padded to
the full size in both directions. This limitation prohibits IP
fragmentation and as a result limits the path MTU discovery.
Third, as reviewed in this paper, QUIC offers many features
that can be employed to further enhance the peroformance of
IoT networks. For example, since most IoT applications do
not rely on high throughput, we did not evaluate the effect of
QUIC’s flow control. However, the study of this mechanism is
left as a future work, which can be justified by IoT applications
such as motion detection and image classification.
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